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service of either a summons and a complaint or a summons with
notice. 66
COURT OF APPEALS RULES- OF PRACTICE
22 NYCRR 500.6(a): Dismissal of appeal for want of prosecution pre-
cludes subsequent appeal in a civil action.
Rule 500.6(a) of the New York Court of Appeals Rules of
Practice requires that an appeal be argued or submitted within 9
months after leave to appeal is granted by the lower court.6 7 Non-
compliance with this provision results in a summary dismissal for
want of prosecution. 68 Recently, in Bray v. Cox, 69 the Court of
Appeals held that such a dismissal in a civil case is an adjudication
on the merits which bars any subsequent appeal of the same is-
sues.
70
The Bray plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by defen-
dant's decedent while the two were returning from a trip to Buf-
falo, New York. The vehicle collided with a utility pole, killing the
driver and injuring the plaintiff. Both parties were residents of
Ontario, Canada, and the car was registered and insured there.
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant's
estate in the Supreme Court, Erie County, to recover for personal
injuries. The court ruled that the Ontario guest statute, which
precluded recovery,7 1 was applicable and dismissed the complaint.
The appellate division reversed, finding error on the conflict of
laws issue. 72 The defendant obtained leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals, but his failure to file and serve the necessary papers for
more than a year resulted in dismissal of the appeal pursuant to
6 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary at 582 (1974).
67 22 NYCRR 500.6(a) provides:
An appeal must be argued or submitted within nine months after the appeal is
taken. If it is not so argued or submitted a summary order of dismissal shall be
entered on the minutes by the clerk without regard to whether or not the record
and briefs have been filed. Notice of entry thereof shall be given by mail to
attorneys of record in the cause.
68 A motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, however, will be denied upon a showing
of an adequate reason for the delay. 10 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 70:260, at 530 (1966);
Peterfreund, Civil Practice, 1959 Survey of New York Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1563, 1581 (1959).
69 38 N.Y.2d 350, 342 N.E.2d 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1976) (per curiam).7 0 Id. at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
71 ONr. REv. STAT. c. 202, § 132(3) (1970) provides:
[T]he owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the
business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle, except
where such loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the gross negligence of
the driver of the motor vehicle.
72 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (4th Dep't 1972).
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rule 500.6(a) and denial of a later motion to vacate the dismissal.7 3
The plaintiff secured a judgment in his favor on the subsequent
trial of the negligence action, whereupon the defendant appealed
directly to the Court of Appeals,7 4 once again seeking review of the
appellate division ruling on the applicability of the Ontario guest
statute.
With three judges dissenting, the Court of Appeals refused to
reach the merits of the case, ruling instead that the appeal was
barred by the prior dismissal for want of prosecution. 5 In support
of this holding, the majority relied upon "sound logic and rea-
son"7 6 together with a sampling of authority from other jurisdic-
tions.77 The Court expressed concern that to allow a subsequent
73 33 N.Y.2d 789, 305 N.E.2d 775, 350 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1973).
74 38 N.Y.2d 350, 342 N.E.2d 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1976). The defendant was
permitted to bring his appeal directly to the Court of Appeals under CPLR 5601(d) which
states in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals as of right from a final judgment
entered in a court of original instance ... where the appellate division has made an
order on a prior appeal in the action which necessarily affects the judgment ....
75 38 N.Y.2d at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.76 1d.
77 The Court cited a number of decisions from the highest benches of other states.
Although most of these cases antedated Bray by as much as 100 years or more, the Court of
Appeals found them applicable since they relied on the same "common law principles and
precedent" that formed the basis for its holding. Id. at 353-54, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 806. Among the cases cited by the majority was Carlberg v. Fields, 33 S.D. 410,
413, 146 N.W. 560, 561 (1914), wherein the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a
dismissal for want of prosecution bars a subsequent appeal on any issues that could have
been raised previously. The Supreme Court of California, in Karth v. Light, 15 Cal. 324
(1860), ruled that a dismissal for want of prosecution constitutes an affirmance of the lower
court's judgment and precludes a second appeal. The Karth court distinguished the situation
in which the appeal is dismissed for a defect in the pleading or the notice of appeal. A
technical defect of this kind, said the court, does not bar a later appeal, but a dismissal for
want of prosecution is dearly resjudicata. Id. at 326-27. Accord, Chamberlain v. Reid, 16 Cal.
208 (1860). TheBray Court also relied on Schmeer v. Schmeer, 16 Ore. 243, 17 P. 864 (1888)
(per curiam), wherein the Supreme Court of Oregon stated: "When a party perfects an
appeal, and then abandons it, his right of appeal is exhausted; the power over the subject is
functus officio, and cannot be exercised the second time." Id. (citation omitted).
The most recent authority relied upon by the Bray Court was Anderson v. Richards, 173
Ohio St. 50, 179 N.E.2d 918 (1962). In that case, the unsuccessful plaintiff had his appeal
dismissed for want of prosecution because he failed to file the necessary notice of appeal
within the prescribed time limit. Upon the denial of his subsequent motion for a new trial,
the plaintiff again appealed to the court of appeals, this time fully complying with all
procedural requirements, and the appellate panel reversed the original judgment. The Ohio
Supreme Court reversed this ruling, however, on the ground that the plaintiff's second
appeal was precluded by the earlier dismissal for want of prosecution. The court declared
that such a subsequent appeal would be permitted only if it were based on "newly discovered
grounds for a new trial." Id. at 55, 179 N.E.2d at 922 (citation omitted).
Although not cited by the Bray Court, decisions of the highest courts in several other
states also support its holding. In Stumpff v. Harper, 90 Okla. 195, 214 P. 709 (1923), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that an appeal is barred by a prior dismissal for want of
prosecution. The court believed that such a ruling was necessary, or "there would be no end
to litigation." Id. at 196, 214 P. at 710. In Friel v. Beadle, 320 Pa. 204, 182 A. 517 (1936) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion, stating that an
appellant should not have "two opportunities to obtain a reversal." Id. at 205, 182 A. at 518.
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appeal following dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution
would encourage use of the interlocutory appeal as a stalling tactic.
The unsuccessful litigant, by the taking of successive appeals, could
seriously delay the enforcement of a judgment and thereby deprive
the successful party of the benefit of a favorable ruling for quite
some time. 78 Furthermore, the Court felt that to permit such ap-
peals would dangerously jeopardize the interests of judicial econ-
omy. 79 Disturbed by the idea that an appellant might have two
opportunities to appeal on identical issues, the majority stated that
"a party should have his day in court, and that day should conclude
the matter."80 The Court also cited its recent opinion in Crane v.
New York, 8 wherein the Court had refused to vacate a dismissal for
want of prosecution of an appeal from a final judgment. Interpret-
ing Crane as holding that the dismissal of an appeal for want of
prosecution is with prejudice, the Bray majority declared that it
would not vary the result in the instant case "simply because the
order appealed from is nonfinal .. . 82
Chief Judge Breitel, who authored the dissenting opinion,83
insisted that a dismissal for want of prosecution could not preclude
a subsequent appeal because such a dismissal is neither an
affirmance nor an adjudication reaching the merits.8 4 Indeed, in
Drummond v. Husson,85 the Court of Appeals had indicated that
dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution does not constitute
affirmance of the judgment below. 86 Similarly, in Palmer v. Foley,87
the Court held that a judgment could not be deemed to have been
affirmed as a result of voluntary discontinuance of an appeal. 88
The apparent implication is that such terminations have no res
Similarly, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, in Succession of Delesdernier, 184 So. 2d 37
(La. 1966), ruled that a dismissal for want of prosecution operates as resjudicata on all issues
raised on that appeal, even though one of the appellants had died while the appeal was still
pending. Id. at 43.Accord, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bullington, 227 Ga. 485, 181 S.E.2d 495
(1971).
71 38 N.Y.2d at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
79Id. at 355, 342 N.E.2d at 577, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
80 Id. at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.81 35 N.Y.2d 945, 324 N.E.2d 550, 365 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1974) (per curiam).
82 38 N.Y.2d at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805.83Judges Jasen and Fuchsberg joined in the Chief Judge's dissent.
84 38 N.Y.2d at 356, 342 N.E.2d at 578, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 807 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
85 14 N.Y. 60 (1856).
86 The Drummond plaintiff sued on a surety agreement whereby the defendants had
guaranteed payment of an earlier judgment against another person if the appeal from the
judgment was affirmed. Since the appeal had been dismissed for want of prosecution, the
Court ruled that affirmance, the condition precedent to the defendants' obligation, had not
occurred. "A dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution, is clearly not an affirmance of
the judgment." Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
8771 N.Y. 106 (1877).
88 Id. at 112.
1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
judicata effect and thus do not bar subsequent appeal. The Bray
majority avoided such a conclusion, however, by finding these cases
distinguishable because they did not specifically address the re-
viewability of issues which could have been raised on an earlier
appeal. 89
The rule announced by the Bray Court will have an immediate
and significant impact on appellate practice in New York. Clearly
intended to relieve some of the burden on the judicial process and
accelerate its machinery, 90 the decision puts appellate counsel on
notice that grants of leave to appeal must not be allowed to slip idly
by. Providing for a point at which the neglect of a party will cause
litigation to terminate is certainly desirable and has been endorsed
by the Supreme Court.91 Nevertheless, the decision in Bray is not
beyond criticism. The majority opinion departed substantially from
the previous rule in New York,92 opting instead for an approach
19 38 N.Y.2d at 354-55, 342 N.E.2d at 577, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 806-07.
9o The majority was concerned that the Court "have the wherewithal to control its
calendar." Id. at 355, 342 N.E.2d at 577, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 807. Court rules of practice,
though they may lack the binding and mandatory nature of statutory requirements, should
be carefully observed. As one authority has noted, "the rules directing the serving of briefs
and filing of a record on appeal are intended to be obeyed, and are not to be lightly
disregarded." 10 CARMODY-WArI 2d § 70:260, at 530-31 (1966).
1, In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), the defendant manufac-
turer was sued by the federal government for having violated price controls. The govern-
ment sought both injunctive relief and treble damages, but agreed to hold the damages claim
in abeyance, pending a final determination of the merits. At trial, the district court found
that there had been no violations and therefore refused to grant the injunction. During the
pendency of the government's appeal the price controls were lifted, and the court of appeals
dismissed the action for mootness. At this point, the government failed to move for an order
vacating the original judgment of the trial court as it should have done in order to preserve
its right to further litigate the case. Accordingly, when the plaintiff thereafter attempted to
revive the damages issue, the Supreme Court denied relief. The Court ruled that the
government's neglect had rendered the dismissal for mootness resjudicata, concluding that
[t]he case is therefore one where the United States, having slept on its rights, now
asks us to do what by orderly procedure it could have lone for itself. The case
illustrates not the hardship of res judicata but the need for it in providing terminal
points for litigation.
Id. at 41.
92 The Court referred to four cases from the appellate division which had reached
condusions contrary to its holding in Bray. In both Whyman & Whyman v. Philips, 36 App.
Div. 2d 812, 320 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam) and Sacramona v. Scalia, 36
App. Div. 2d 942, 321 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam), the appellants were
permitted to sustain appeals, despite the fact that their appeals on the same issues had
previously been dismissed for want of prosecution. In French v. Row, 28 N.Y.S. 849 (4th
Dep't 1894), the defendant's failure to prosecute an appeal taken from an interlocutory
order of the trial court resulted in a dismissal by the appellate division. After judgment for
the plaintiff, the defendant appealed again, raising the issue of the interlocutory order for a
second time. The court permitted the appeal, relying on the Drummond holding that a
dismissal for want of prosecution was not an affirmance. Id. at 854. A similar result was
reached in Sperling v. Boll, 26 App. Div. 64, 50 N.Y.S. 209 (1st Dep't 1898), wherein the
court ruled that a dismissal for want of prosecution is not binding on the merits, so that "if
the appeal should subsequently come properly before the court there would be nothing to
prevent an inquiry into the merits." Id. at 67, 50 N.Y.S. at 211. The Bray majority reasoned
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previously adopted by a number of other states. 93 It should be
noted, however, that there is an equally compelling amount of
authority from other jurisdictions supporting the position of the
dissent.94
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on Crane v. New York 95
may be misplaced. The case is cited for the proposition that a
500.6(a) dismissal of an appeal from a final judgment is with
prejudice.9 6 The Crane holding, however, is easily susceptible of a
much narrower interpretation. The appellant therein had suffered.
a dismissal for want of prosecution after neglecting his appeal from
a final judgment for more than 6 years. In the ruling cited by the
Bray majority, the Court of Appeals merely denied the appellant's
motion to vacate the previous dismissal. 97 Considering the inordi-
nate delay involved, it is questionable whether the Crane holding
requires a finding of prejudice in all cases wherein an appeal from
a final judgment has been dismissed under rule 500.6(a). Surely,'
that these decisions had either misinterpreted Dnmmond and Palmer or relied on no author-
ity at all, and therefore "should no longer be considered sound." 38 N.Y.2d at 355, 342
N.E.2d at 577, 379 N.Y..S.2d at 807.
Another New York case that has particular relevance here is Culliford v. Gadd, 135
N.Y. 632, 32 N.E. 136 (1892) (per curiam), wherein it was held that a dismissal for want of
prosecution returns the case to the same position as if no appeal had been taken, thereby
entitling the parties to appeal again. Although this appears to be the only precedent frorri
the Court of Appeals that is directly in point, it was completely ignored by the Bray majority
and received only an oblique reference in the dissenting opinion. See 38 N.Y.2d at 357, 342
N.E.2d at 578, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting). In Myers v. Myers, 169 Misc.
32, 6 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Family Ct. New York County), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 255 App.
Div. 599, 8 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1st Dep't 1938), it was stated: "It is axiomatic that upon the
dismissal of a proceeding by an appellate court the rights of the parties to the litigation, if
any there are, are re-established as if no judgment had been rendered or order made." 1-69
Misc. at 34, 6 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Unfortunately, the judge rendering the decision cited no
authority in support of this "axiom."
Based on this prior case law, a frequently cited practitioner's guide stated the rule to be
that a dismissal for want of prosecution does not ordinarily preclude a subsequent appeal,
provided that the appellant repeats the proper procedure of obtaining leave to appeal from
the court below. 10 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 70:32, at 298-99 (1966).
9 See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
'
4 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 53 Ala. App. 194, 298 So. 2d 616 (1973); Wagner v. Bieley,
Wagner & Associates, Inc., 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Doonan v. Winterset, 224 Iowa 365, 275
N.W. 640 (1937); Helm v. Boone, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marshall) 351 (1831); Brillhart v. Beever,
198 S.W. 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Marshall v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 20 Wis. 676
(1866). Early decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States also provide some support
for the position of the Bray dissent. See Evans v. State Bank, 134 U.S. 330 (1890); United
States v. De Pacheco, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 261 (1858); Steamer Virginia v. West, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 182 (1857). Some of this authority is acknowledged by the Bray majority. 38 N.Y.2d at
354 n.1, 342 N.E.2d at 577 n.1, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 806 n.1.
9- 35 N.Y.2d 945, 324 N.E.2d 550, 365 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1974) (per curiam).
96 38 N.Y.2d at 353, 342 N.E.2d at 576, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 805. See text accompanying
notes 82-83 supra.
97 35 N.Y.2d 945, 946, 324 N.E.2d 550, 365 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (1974) (per curiam.
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the ruling need not dictate such a result where, as in Bray, the
judgment below is nonfinal and the delay in prosecution is little
more than a year.
Finally, it is clear that in New York a dismissal for want of
prosecution at the trial level does not normally bar a subsequent
action on the same issues in that cause. 98 It is difficult to see why
dismissal should have a more terminal effect in an appellate court
than it does upon the original trial of the action. The Court of
Appeals has stated that since such a dismissal by the trial court "was
not rendered upon the merits, it does not prevent [a subsequent]
action for the same cause of action." 99 Clearly, the same reasoning
could be readily applied to a dismissal for failure to prosecute by
an appellate court. Moreover, the demands of judicial economy
and fairness to the parties would seem to be equally compelling at
both levels.
Thus, while support can be found for the majority's ruling in
both logic and precedent, the wisdom of its decision remains sub-
ject to question. Nevertheless, the impact of the holding is clear. As
long as Bray continues to control in New York, the practitioner
should be aware that grants of leave to appeal in a civil case must
not be neglected, for the opportunity to appeal on the same issues
will not arise again.
98 CPLR 3216(a) states:
Where a party unreasonably neglects to proceed generally in an action or otherwise
delays in the prosecution thereof against any party who may be liable to a separate
judgment . . . the court, on its own initiative or upon motion, may dismiss the
party's pleading on terms. Unless the order specifies otherwise, the dismissal is not
on the merits.
The commentary to this rule observes that "[i]f the motion is made and granted and the
order and/orjudgment states only that it is for neglect to prosecute, a second action will not
be met by the defense of res judicata .... " 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 922
(1970). Accord, Mintzer v. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 27, 197 N.Y.S.2d
54 (Ist Dep't 1960); Concrete Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 174 N.Y.LJ. 79,
Oct. 22, 1975, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); De Marco v. Boghossian, 37 Misc. 2d 701,
236 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Westchester County Ct. 1962). The court can specify that a 3216 dismissal
is on the merits, in which case it would have res judicata effect. This is most unusual,
however, and is likely to occur only where the record strongly suggests that the case is
defective on the merits. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 922-23 (1970). Interest-
ingly, the Court of Appeals has ruled that even where a dismissal is on the merits, it is still
not res judicata where title to realty is involved. Headley v. Noto, 22 N.Y.2d 1, 237 N.E.2d
871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968), discussed in 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary at 923
(1970). For a discussion of CPLR 3216 and its battle-scarred history, see The Quarterly Survey,
41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 279, 312 (1966). See also The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 792, 819
(1975), wherein CPLR 3216 is distinguished from CPLR 3404 which effects an automatic
dismissal upon the abandonment of an action for more than one year. A dismissal under
CPLR 3404 does not preclude another action. Id. at 820.
9' Gundersheim v. Bradley-Mahony Coal Corp., 295 N.Y. 539, 541, 68 N.E.2d 599
(1946) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
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